The most significant turning point in the conflict in Syria was not the use of chemical weapons against civilians last month, but something that happened over two years ago.
I refer to the point in July 2011 when the protestors against the Assad regime decided to forsake the popular nonviolent protests characterizing much of the Arab Spring in favor of an armed insurgency.
Since then, an estimated 100,000 people have lost their lives in the fighting, and nearly two million refugees have fled to neighboring countries.
I call the 2011 tactical shift the most significant point in the conflict for three reasons.
First, it was the point at which there were no longer any “good guys.” The international community is currently tearing out its hair over the question of how to support the “right” side in this conflict. On the one hand, there seems to be evidence that Assad has added chemical attacks to the substantial list of crimes against his own people. On the other hand, the opposition groups are suspected of ill intentions toward the rights of religious minorities.
This brings me to the second reason that 2011 was the critical turning point. The move to engage in armed insurgency provided all the moral legitimacy Assad could possibly want. No longer could the opposition claim to want a genuine democracy characterized by fair elections and protection of minorities. The mostly-Sunni Free Syrian Army lost all credibility with the Christian and Alawite (Shia) minorities, whose only alternative seemed to be to support Assad. Turning a nonviolent popular uprising into an armed struggle does not make a movement more popular, but less. It confirms the fears of minorities that the goal is not legitimate democracy characterized by people power, but rather an ideologically pure replacement of the current regime. Furthermore, Assad could not have asked for a better way to justify the repressive tactics of his security forces than the fact that he was given grounds for labeling his opponents “terrorists.” Assad’s accusation stuck because the academic differences between terrorism and guerilla warfare break down on the ground.
Finally, and most significantly, in taking up arms the opposition effectively cut their chances of success in half. The word “half” is not simply pulled out of the blue; it is based on extensive evidence gathered most effectively by Erica Chenoweth and Maria Stephan in their book Why Civil Resistance Works (Columbia, 2011). Analyzing data from movements all over the world over the course of the last century, they discovered that nonviolent resistance campaigns are far more effective in achieving their goals than are violent campaigns, even against harsh regimes. They identify several reasons for this, all of which are relevant to Syria. Nonviolent movements have fewer barriers to participation, resulting in a more numerous and diverse membership, longer sustainability, and more successful civic disruption. Nonviolent campaigns also experience more loyalty shifts away from the regime, whose repression tactics then backfire. They also experience more international sympathy and support and greater innovation in tactics.
The authors conclude, “Nonviolent civil resistance works, both in terms of achieving campaigns’ strategic objectives and in terms of promoting the long-term well-being of the societies in which the campaigns have been waged. Violent insurgency, on the other hand, has a dismal record on both counts” (222). They argue that the evidence challenges the claim that violence used by any group is only a last resort; “The argument that using violent resistance is the only effective way to win concessions from a repressive adversary simply does not stand up to the evidence. Nonviolent resistance has the strategic edge (226).”
Chenoweth and Stephan prove what just peacemaking theory already presupposes: that violent resistance is not only morally unjustifiable but also relatively ineffective both in the long and short run. The practices of just peacemaking are never exhausted, so that violence can be justified as a last resort.
If anything good can come out of the tragedy in Syria, it is this: That it will be clearly evident to all the justice movements around the world that turning from popular nonviolent protest to weapons means that the battle is already lost. It means that the peculiar and underestimated power of the collective will of women, children, and men is abandoned in favor of a mirage of power in the form of guns. Thanks to the new data, we now know it’s not just a gut feeling – it’s also simple math.